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Abstract
Reliability assessment is concerned with the analysis of devices and systems whose individual components are prone
to fail. This reliability analysis documents the process and results of reliability determination of the JEM-EUSO
Photomultiplier tube component using the methods 217 Plus, Quantum efficiency degradation and radiation hardness
assurance. In conclusion, the levels of damage suffered by the PMTs which comprise the focal surface of JEM-
EUSO Space Telescope, are acceptable. The results show as well that the greatest contribution to the failure is due
to radiation SET. The guaranteed performance of this equipment is a 99.45%, an accepted value of reliability thus
fulfilling the objectives and technological challenges of JEM-EUSO. It should be noted that the reliability values of
the Standard 217Plus, despite being a standard improved, and an updated version of MIL-HDBK-217 Plus does not
have sections that include the analysis of radiation of space electronic equipment. The recommendation from this
study is the inclusion of all real failure effects may face an electronic, mechanical, optical space equipment.
Keywords: JEM-EUSO, PMT’s, Reliability.
1. Introduction
JEM-EUSO [1, 2] is a large imaging telescope de-
signed to study the Ultra-High Energy Cosmic Rays
(UHECR) at energies above 1020 eV, as represented by
Figure 1. Looking downward the Earth from the In-
ternational Space Station (ISS) it will detect such cos-
mic ray particles observing the UV light generated by
Extensive Air Showers (EAS) while the UHECRs de-
velop in the atmosphere. The scientific objectives of
the mission include charged particle Astronomy and
a promising branch of Astrophysics, called Astropar-
ticle Physics, with the aim of extending the measure-
ment of the energy spectra of the cosmic radiation be-
yond the Greisen-Zatsepin-Kuzmin (GZK) effect [3],
together with the detection of Extremely High Energy
Gamma Rays (EHEGR) and Extremely High Energy
Neutrinos (EHEN).
∗Corresponding Author: H. Prieto-Alfonso, Univer-
sity of Alcala´, Alcala´ de Henares, 28871, Madrid, Spain;
Email:hector.prietoa@uah.es.
JEM-EUSO is being designed to operate for 5 years
onboard the ISS orbiting in a Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
around the Earth at an altitude of about 400 km. As for
any mission to be operated in space, JEM-EUSO must
comply with specific requirements, i.e. high radiation
doses, unaccessibility and remote controlled operations.
That is why the reliability analysis and radiation hard-
ness assurance is extremely important in order to deter-
mine the tolerance and redundacy requirements within
the system as previous studies show in case of Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA) which also applies to
PMTs [4, 5, 6].
The design and the construction of the JEM-EUSO
telescope is a real technical challenge, as it involves the
use of new technologies from the laboratories of both in-
dustrial and research centers in areas as diverse as large
optical and accurate Fresnel lenses, a novel technique
of photo detection highly sensitive with very accurate
resolution, and very innovative analog and digital elec-
tronics as well.
The paper is organized as follows. First of all, we
have explained the considerations we have taken into
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Figure 1: JEM-EUSO telescope onboard the Interna-
tional Space Station [2]
account to make the reliability analysis, then a brief ex-
planation of possible failures of PMT are shown in sec-
tion 3, along with the elements that compose the PMT
in section 4. In section 5 the reliability analysis of the
PMT has been performed and finally in section 6 the
conclusions and results of the analysis are presented.
2. Technical Specifications of JEM-EUSO PMTs
The focal surface is a spherical curved surface,
its area amounts to about 4.5 m2 and it is cov-
ered with about 5,000 Multi-Anode PhotoMultiplier
Tubes (MAPMT) Hamamatsu R11265-03-M64 MOD:
MAPMT designed for this space mission. The fo-
cal surface detector consists of Photo-Detector Modules
(PDMs), each of which consists of 9 Elementary Cells
(ECs). The EC implements 4 units of MAPMTs. There-
fore, about 1,233 ECs or about 137 PDMs are arranged
on the whole focal surface with 384,000 pixels [7].
Standards that describe PMTs reliability have not
been developed so far, however we have considered the
case of Vacuum Tubes (VT) and Integrated Circuits (IC)
because of the similarity among them and PMTs. This
has been done in order to develop a model for the PMT
electronics behaviour taking as reference the most sim-
ilar element in terms of functionality.
This study of the reliability of the PMT is a statisti-
cal study, not a performance study, referred to the failure
rates of the PMT under the differents mechanism of fail-
ure, such a cracks in the envelope, electromigration, and
multiple electronic behaviour such as short-circuits. In
any case, this paper never tries to simulate the reliability
of the performance of the PMT, which mean the reliabil-
ity of the transmission of the signal, quality of the sig-
nal, neither the degradation of the performance during
operation of the PMT (Background events), these events
can be studied in other papers. In the another hand, this
study will consider the PMT as a semiconductor, since
most of the element are composed by alkali materials,
considerations previously made by different studies in-
cluding theory of the principal manufacturer of PMT as
Hamamatsu [8]. in such a way we will proceed with this
study taking into account the considerations also made
by previous studies and theories [9, 10, 11].
If we try to compare PMT with ICs, the only rea-
son we consider their relationship is because the IC and
PMT in a reliability model are considered as system
themself, however, according to this assumption, the IC
is the closest electronic component to the PMT in the
reliability standards we have so far [12, 13]. Table 1
shows main differences among PMTs, VTs and ICs .
Table 1. Differences among PMTs, VTs and ICs de-
vices.
Element Material Feature Size Physical Conditions Operating Voltage (V)
Anode 2”<Size≤30”
PMT Cathode:(AgOCs,(SbKcS) mm Affected by Vibration 500< V ≤3000
Dynode:(AgMg),(CuBe) Affected by Shock
Affected by Light
Vacuum Anode:Ni(Nickel) 1.5”<Size≤25”
Tube Cathode:W (Tungsten) mm Affected By Vibration 10 < V ≤15000
Grid: Ni(Nickel) Affected By Shock
1.5”<Size≤25”
Integrated SiO2(Silicon Dioxide) nm Vibration Resistance 2.3 < V ≤5
Circuit Shocking Resistance
Affected by temperature
The PMTs used in JEM-EUSO have been specially
designed and manufactured by Hamamatsu and are in-
tended for this space mission. With the aim to improve
the technical specification of the PMT for the JEM-
EUSO Space telescope, Hamamatsu, the Japanese com-
pany, has developed dedicated PMTs according to the
JEM-EUSO Space requirements. Tables 2 & 3 show
technical characteristics of the PMT, with a spectral
window in the UV enough broad to observe both the
fluorescence as Cherenkov light generated in the EAS.
A gain ratio of 106 added to a cathode sensitivity of 90
µA/lm allows the detection of low light levels with a
very low dark current of 0.4 nA. The PMT is operative
in a wide temperature range. Table 4 lists nominal volt-
age ratios for the dynode of the PMTs.
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Table 2. Technical specifications of the JEM-EUSO
PMT [14]
Parameter Description
Spectral Response Range 185 to 650 nm
Window material/Thickness Ultra Violet glass/0.8 mm
Photocathode Material Bialkali
Photocathode minimun effective area 23×23 mm2
Dynode structure Metal channel Dynode
Number of stages 12
Weight 27 g
Operating ambient temperature -30 to +50◦C
Storage temperature -30 to +50◦C
Voltage Supply (anode-cathode) 1100 VDC
Average anode current 0.1 mA
Table 3. Electronic characteristics of the JEM-EUSO
PMT at 25◦C [14]
Parameter Min Typ. Max. Unit
Cathode Sensitivity Luminous (2856K) 70 90 - µA/lm
Anode Sensitivity Luminous (2856K) - 90 - A/lm
Gain (Current Amplification) - 1×106 - -
Anode Dark Current (Each Anode)
(After 30 min. storage in darkness) - 0.4 4 nA
Cathode Sensitivity Anode Pulse Rise Time
Anode Transit Time
-
-
0.6
5.1
-
-
ns
ns
Uniformity Ratio Between Anodes N/A 1:3 1:5 N/A
Pulse Linearity
(Each Anode)
±2% Deviation
±5% Deviation
-
-
0.2
0.4
-
-
mA
mA
Table 4. Nominal voltage distribution ratios for JEM-
EUSO PMTs where Dynodes from 3 to 10 have voltage
distribution ratio 1 [14]
Electrodes K Dy1 Dy2 Dy3 Dy10 Dy11 Dy12 G.R P
Ratio 2.3 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 1 1 0.5
3. PMT Reliability Analysis
3.1. PMT Failure Rate
Failure rate is the frequency with which an engi-
neered system or component fails, expressed, for in-
stance, in failures per hour. It is often denoted by the
Greek letter λ and is important in reliability engineer-
ing. The failure rate of a system usually depends on
time, with the rate varying over the life cycle of the sys-
tem. In practice, the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) 1
λ
,
is often reported instead of the failure rate. This is valid
and useful if the failure rate may be assumed constant,
often it is used for complex units or systems, electron-
ics, and is a general agreement in some reliability stan-
dards (Military and Aerospace). Failure rates are im-
portant factors in the insurance, finance, commerce and
regulatory industries and fundamental to the design of
safe systems in a wide variety of applications.
We can classify failures in two types according to
their effects on the device: catastrophic and partial fail-
ures.
3.1.1. Catastrophic Failure
A catastrophic failure is a sudden and total failure of
some system from which recovery is impossible. Catas-
trophic failures often lead to cascading systems failure.
The term is most commonly used for structural failures,
but has often been extended to many other disciplines
where total and irrecoverable loss occurs. Failures such
as cracks in the glass envelope, electrodes no longer
connected or short-circuited, resulting in useless or non-
existent signals at the output are considered catastrophic
failures in PMTs.
3.1.2. Partial Failures
Partial failures are fails in a system or part of a sys-
tem from which recovery of part or all the system is
possible. These kind of failures include temporal fail-
ures. Failures such as high dark current (noisy tube),
gain drifts, decrease of cathode sensitivity, resulting in
incorrect or degraded signals at the output are consid-
ered partial failures.
Due to long-term stability problem, an aging period
has to be applied whenever tubes have not been oper-
ated for a long time. PMTs which do not reach a fairly
constant gain after that period can be regarded as fail-
ing. This clearly indicates that the reliability of PMTs
is closely connected to the mode of operation (volt-
age, mean anode current, etc.) and to the specifications
which are expected from these tubes. It is also clear
that photomultipliers are more like systems than compo-
nents as far as reliability is concerned due the numerous
characteristics affecting their operation (cathode sensi-
tivity, noise, gain, etc.) [15].
The reliability analysis of the PMT is a critical topic
in ground-based experiments and space missions where
the proper working condition of PMT’s are crucial for
the success of the experiment. The reliability of the
JEM-EUSO PMTs should be high due to the big amount
of PMT necessary to implement the whole focal surface
of the JEM-EUSO Space telescope. The propagation of
failure rate caused by this amount of components makes
mandatory the usage of high reliable components. As
usual, two types of failure must be determined [15].
The main scope of the reliability analysis could be
summarized to assess that PMT design satisfies the re-
quired quality/reliability objectives and mission spec-
ifications and to assess the quality and reliability are
maintained at prescribed levels. The analysis consists
of three main sections:
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• To define the overall purpose, scope , nomencla-
ture, and general reference material for the relia-
bility analysis.
• To define the analysis methods used and the calcu-
lated failure rates of system components.
• To state conclusions, including the overall system
reliability.
3.2. Rational For Excluded Items
The following elements are excluded from this as-
sessment:
• Structural elements, as far as they are controlled
by demonstrating positive Margin of Safety when
applying Factor of Safety to design strength, in or-
der to warrantee the structural capacity of the sys-
tem beyond the expected loads. Indeed the Factors
of Safety are related to reliability. Design is then
qualified and the Hardware Manufacturing tested
for acceptance. Fatigue and fracture analysis may
be applied to identify resistance versus life time of
the mission (in this case 5 years instead of 3 years
are required).
• Non electronic optical elements, like lenses and fil-
ters, shall be demonstrated to meet the required
functional performance by a proper dimensioning
at End of Life conditions and the application of
life Safety Factors, so that their degradation does
not degrade the mission during the required mis-
sion lapse of time. Under a structural point of view
they shall be treated with the same philosophy of
structural items.
• Passive thermal control, like Multi Layer Insula-
tion (MLI) and thermal washers, shall be demon-
strated to meet the required thermal performances
by a proper dimensioning at End of Life conditions
and the application of Life Safety Factors, so that
their degradation does not degrade the mission dur-
ing the required mission lapse of time.
• Hardness and connectors are controlled by using
qualified materials and by applying the required
Safety Factors in the design phase. Manufacturing
by qualified providers, integration by verified pro-
cedure, verification campaign shall warrantee the
required level of reliability. These values will be
assessed in a future paper.
• Software (if any) is controlled by on ground
SW Quality Assurance according to the identified
level of criticality. Interactions between Hardware
and SW might be assessed in HSIA (Hardware-
Software Interaction Analysis) in a later stage of
the project, to verify the reaction of SW after any
HW failure.
3.3. Component Reliability Analysis
The analysis was conducted for the JEM-EUSO PMT
in accordance with the ”Parts Stress Analysis” Method
given in MIL-HDBK-217-F [16, 17].
Following assumptions were made during analysis
for each component and the stress analysis:
• Uniformity. All elements which compose the PMT
must be statistically identical (within the same
batch number).
• Independent trials. The success or failure of any
component must not affect the outcome of the next
trial.
• Constant rate of failure. The rate of failure from
one trial to the next must remain constant.
• Space Environment
• Ambient temperature (−30◦C to 40◦C)
• Junction temperature 125◦C to 150◦C
• Duty Cycle ∼ 20%
• Cycling Rate = 5840 ∼ (16 days × 30 days × 1
year)
• Electrical stress ≤ 0.5
4. Partial failure evaluation of JEM-EUSO PMTs
4.1. Quantum Efficiency Degradation
Definitely, the lifetime of the PMT is linearly depen-
dent of the working conditions when using it as well as
for the charged applied on it. The following equations
can explain clearly this situation
QE(t) = QE0 e−t/τ (1)
where QE0 is the quantum efficiency of a new unused
PMT; τ is the lifetime of the cathode PMT under work-
ing conditions. As the PMTs lifetime is depending of
the use, τ is not a good parameter to characterize PMTs
by its dependence on the working conditions.
QE(q) = QE0 e−q/τq (2)
where τq is the lifetime of the cathode PMT under
charges applied on it. In many cases, this value is
roughly 2-3 C/cm2.
However, in case of evaluating the time dependent
quantum efficiency, the next relation is assumed because
of the linearity of both equations:
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t
τ
=
q
τq
(3)
Therefore, in order to perform the analysis of the
Q(q), the q is necessary to be evaluated, where q, is
the charge collected at the cathode, expressed in C/cm2
which is determined as follows:
q =
e− · φγ · t · Eγ · QEO
Ei · S PMT (4)
Since q is the relation between the charge collected
per unit area, some considerations have been taken
into account in order to express it including the intrin-
sic/physical parameters of the material. To express the
Charge, into couloumbs, for instance it is necessary to
consider the effect of the gain as the quality of the ma-
terial to amplify the photo-current received, and this
photocurrent is basically the product of the electron’s
charge by the flux of photons received as well as by the
product of the initial quantum efficiency of the mate-
rial, which is the amount of electrons produced per pho-
ton perceived. The division of the equation is related to
the unit area necessary to express the charge collected.
For instance, it is necessary to multiply the unit area by
the Ionization Energy because it is basically the energy
necesary to remove an electron per unit area.
Where the values considered to calculate the charge
collected are provided in table 5
Table 5: JEM-EUSO PMTs QE parameters
Parameter Value
Initial Quantum Efficiency (QEO ) 20 %
Electron’s Charge (e−) 1.6× 10−19C
Photon Flux (φγ) 1.2× 109ph/s
Time (t) 5 Years
Photons Energy (Eγ ) 4.14 eV
Charge collection (τq) 2-3 C/cm2
Ionization Energy (Ei) 1.9eV
Photocathode Active Surface (S PMT ) 5.29 cm2
Anyway, considering equation 3, the lifetime can be
calculated as follows:
τ =
τq · Ei · S PMT
e−φγ · Eγ · QEO
(5)
Finally, according to equation 5 , the lifetime is
1.264× 1011s. Therefore, the quantum efficiency over
time is as Equation 6 reflects, considering t as 5 year
functioning.
Q(t) = QEOe
−t/τ = 19.975% (6)
In other words, a loss of 0.15% of the quantum effi-
ciency in 5 years per PMT as seen in Figure 4 where the
first 5 years of degradation are expressed by the red line
over the blue line. According to this study, the quantum
efficiency degradation is absolutely negligible. It can be
also said that it is related to the low level of illumination
the PMTs are going to be exposed to during the time of
the mission.
Figure 2: JEM-EUSO PMTs Quantum Efficiency degra-
dation expressed at different time periods. According to
this results, the QE degradation is negligible
Therefore we consider the failure rate of the PMT due
to the degradation of the quantum efficiency as the in-
verse of the lifetime, as λQE = 2.85× 10−2 Failures/106
h. Hence, the MTTF is 35×106 h.
Since the Quantum efficiency affects some perfor-
mance characteristics of the PMT as Sensitivity and De-
tectivity, their affection and contribution has been evalu-
ated in the following subsections. However, since their
failure rate is related to the Quantum efficiency, their
value has not been calculated but considered anyway
as a contribution to the total failure rate of the QE ex-
pressed above. Anyway, its important to higlight that
Sensitivity ad Detectivity are expressions of the QE af-
fection, their study it is necessary to understand the
meaning of the degradation of the QE.
4.2. PMTs Detectivity Degradation
Noise Equivalent Power (NEP) is the quantity of inci-
dent light equal to the intrinsic noise level of a detector.
In other words, this is the quantity of incident light when
the signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) is 1 [18].
The inverse value of NEP is the detectivity (detection
capability). The detectivity is a measure of the least de-
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tectable radiant power or detector signal to noise ratio.
A higher D indicates ability to detect lower levels of ra-
diant power [19].
Therefore, the NEP is calculated as follows:
NEP =
hc
ηλ
(
2ID
q
)1/2
= 1.48 × 10−17W (7)
Where the values considered to calculate the dark cur-
rent are provided in table 6
Table 6: JEM-EUSO PMTs NEP characteristics
Parameter Value
Planck constant (h) 6.62× 10−34 J·s
Speed of light (c) 3× 108ms−1
Dark Current (ID) 1.63× 10−18A
Elementary charge of the electron (q) 1.62×10−19 C
Hence, η is expressed as a time function is calculated
according to equation 6 and dark current ID is deter-
mined as follows:
ID = aAT 2exp
(−φ0
kT
)
= 1.63 × 10−18A (8)
The values considered to calculate the dark current
and finally obtain the NEP and therfore the detectivity
are provided in table 7
Table 7: JEM-EUSO PMTs ID characteristics
Parameter Value
Richardson’s constant (a) 1.2× 106 A/(m2 K2)
Absolute temperature (T) in K 300 K
Work function (φ) 1.52eV
Boltzmann’s constant (K) 1.38× 10−23J/K
Cathode Area (A) 5.29 × 10−4cm2
Previously we mentioned that the reduction of a PMT
quantum efficiency is a parameter that directly affects its
performance. Hence this can be seen not only as a per-
centage of the ratio of photons entering the number of
subsequently emitted electron. The quantum efficiency
degradation can be also express in terms of loss of de-
tectivity of the detector, ie as soon as it has reduced
the ability of photons that can be detected throughout
the lifespan and therefore the number of photons pro-
duced. This effect is shown by Figure 3, which clearly
shows the linearity between the QE and detectivity. In
the end, the reduction of the detectivity is as low as the
QE. However its reduction is not considerable enough
during the period of the mission since 0.15% of loss is
acceptable considering that 10% of threshold loss is ac-
cepted by the JEM-EUSO science comitee.
Figure 3: JEM-EUSO PMTs detectivity degradation ex-
pressed for different time periods
4.3. PMTs Sensitivity Degradation
The responsivity expresses how much electrical sig-
nal is generated when a given amount of optical flux
(power) is incident on a detector, and it can be also con-
sider as the sensitivity of the detector. The electrical
quantity can be current or voltage [20].
Responsivity = S ensitivity =
ηq
hv
(9)
Hence, η is expressed as a time function is calculated
according to equation 6, However, the values considered
to calculate the sensitivity are provided in table 8
Table 8: JEM-EUSO PMTs sensitivity characteristics
Parameter Value
Quantum Efficiency (η) 20%
Elementary charge of the electron (q) 1.62×10−19 C
Planck constant (h) 6.62× 10−34 J·s
Optical frequency (v) 1× 1015hz
As for detectivity, sensitivity is a parameter related
to the quantum efficiency. Its behavior allows to ob-
serve the performance of the PMTs. Its understanding
also contributes to calibrate the instrument in order to
guarantee the success of the mission. However, the sen-
sitivity shown by this study, is within the parameters of
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the manufacturer, with a value of about 70.49 µA/lm
over the first 5 years and a reduction of up to 0.1% of its
value during the same period of time.
Figure 4: JEM-EUSO PMTs Sensitivity degradation ex-
pressed for different time periods
4.4. PMTs performance degradation due to radiation
According to [21], the amount of PMTs that will fail
during the JEM-EUSO is about 16 including all type of
radiation sources. Therefore, the failure rate in terms of
radiation is λRAD = 7.3 × 10−2 Failures/ 1× 106 h, hence,
the MTTF of about 1.37 × 107. This values will be ex-
plained in detail in the nexts subsections when whole
sources of failure are considered in order to stablish the
total Failure Rate of the JEM-EUSO PMTs.
5. Catastrophic failure evaluation of JEM-EUSO
PMTs using 217 Plus Standard
Reliability analysis using standard 217 Plus is quite
useful since It is basically the latest version of MIL-
HDBK-217-F. Also, the 217 Plus has optional data in-
cluded in order to enhance the predicted failure rate
by adding more detailed pertaining to environmental
stresses, operating profile factors and process grades.
It also contains default values for the environmental
stresses and environmental profile as well as many
more and new components missing in MIL-HDBK-217-
F. The failure rate (λp) for plastic encapsulated (non-
hermetic) integrated circuit applicable for the PMT is
given by equation 10, and the the conditions and values
according to the 217 Plus standard are shown in Table 9
. These values allow us to estimate the base failure rate
and failure rate multipliers for any environmental, with
operational as well as non operational conditions which
the component is exposed to. The calculations results
from the failure rate evaluation made to The PMT are
shown in Table 10.
λP = piG(λOBpiDCOpiTO + λEBpiDCNpiRHT+
λTCBpiCRpiDT ) + λS JBpiS JDT + λEOS
(10)
The key factor in failure rate evaluation for PMT ac-
cording to 217 Plus is: Failure rate multiplier, solder
joint delta temperature (piS JDT ), this value reflects that
the most important aspect to consider when assembling
our electronics system in case of PMT is soldering, a
well known critical parameter to be considered, which
is now confirmed and reflected by this evaluation.
Table 9: PMT Condition Values according to 217 Plus
Condition Value
Integrated Circuit, Plastic Encapsulated PMT
Year of Manufacture 2010
Growth constant (β) 0.293
Duty Cycle 20%
Cycling Rate 5840
Activation Energy Operating (Eaop) 0.8
Activation Energy nonoperating (Eanonop) 0.3
Ambient temperature, operating in ◦C (TAO) 26◦C
Ambient temperature, non operating in ◦C (TAE) 15◦C
Duty Cycle Operating (DC1op) 0.72
Duty Cycle non Operating (DC1nonop) 0.28
Default temperature rise (TRde f ault) in ◦C 25◦C
Delta Temperature (DT1) in ◦C 26.5◦C
Cycling Rate (CR1) 482.46
Table 10: PMT Failure Rate Calculations according to
217 Plus
Failure Rate Multiplier (FRM) Symbol Result
Reliability Growth FRM piG 6.867 × 10−3
Base failure rate, Operating λOB 8 × 10−6
FRM for Duty Cycle Operating piDCO 0.27
FRM for Temperature Operating piTO 12.18
Base failure rate, Environmental λEB 1.997 × 10−3
FRM, Duty Cycle, Non operating piDCN 1.11
FRM for Temperature environment piRHT 0
Base failure rate, Temp Cycling λTCB 8.9 × 10−5
FRM, Cycling Rate piCR 12.10
FRM,Delta Temperature piDT 3.405
Base failure rate, Solder Joint λS JB 4.850 × 10−3
FRM, Solder Joint Delta Temp piS JDT 0.635
Failure rate Electrical Overstress λEOS 1.562 × 10−3
Failure Rate = 2.334 × 10−2 F/106h
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6. Estimation of PMTs reliability and Discussions
Reliability has many connotations. In general, it
refers to an item’s ability to successfully perform an in-
tended function during a Space mission. The longer the
item performs its intended function, the more reliable it
is.
Some systems, such as spacecrafts, cannot be re-
paired after a major failure, which is obviously the case
of JEM-EUSO PMTs. In other cases, even though main-
tenance tasks can be performed offline, they cannot be
performed during a mission. For all of these types of
non-repairable systems, the time to system failure is an
important reliability characteristic. The expected value
is known as mean time to failure (MTTF). [22].
Table 11. PMT Failure Rates values
aaaaaaaaa
Reliability
Expression
Study
Radiation Quantum Efficiency 217 Plus
Failure Rate 7.3 × 10−2 h 2.85 × 10−2 h 2.334 × 10−2 h
The failure rates calculated before yield the MTTF
Values are listed in Table 11. A MTTF of 8 million
hours (8×106 hours) according to the addition of ev-
ery PMT failure source. Certainly they do not mean
we can expect an individual device to operate for 913
years before failing. MTTF is a statistical measure, and
as such, it cannot predict anything for a single unit. As-
suming that during the useful operating life period the
PMT have constant failure rates, and part failure rates
(λparts) follow an poissonian distribution. In this case,
the MTTF of the product can be calculated as:
MTTF =
1∑
λPMT
(11)
and the probability that the product will work for
some time t without failure is given by:
P(t) = e−
t
MTTF (12)
Thus, in case of our JEM-EUSO PMT with an MTTF
of 8·106 hrs (All failure sources included) and a mission
duration of 5 years (43,800 hrs) of continuous operation,
Ptc = e
− 43800
8×106 = 99, 45% (13)
Ptc(t) shows that the PMT functioning at the end of
5 years operation period will be operated with 99.45%
of reliability for five years without a failure. Figure 5
illustrates this situation. In other words, an estimated
lost of 0.55% of the JEM-EUSO telescope focal surface
in 5 years of operation period according to 217 Plus,
radiation failure sources and Quantum efficiency degra-
dation. We can use MTTF rating more accurately, how-
ever, in JEM-EUSO focal surface we have 4,932 PMT
operating continuously, so, we can expect 27 PMTs to
fail in five operation years according to this study.
Figure 5: JEM-EUSO PMTs reliability vs time includ-
ing multiple failure sources
7. Approximate number of PMTs failures
In order to have an idea of how the JEM-EUSO PMTs
would fail during the time of the mission, it is necessary
to determine how this specific failures are going to be
distributed. The best way of doing this, is to apply pois-
son distribution.
The Poisson equation for predicting the probability of
a specific number of failures (r) in time (t) is as follows
[23] :
P(r) =
(λt)re−λt
r!
(14)
where:
• r = number of failures in time (t)
• λ = failure rate per hour
• t = time expressed in hours
• P(t) = probability of getting specific r failures in
time t
Assuming that the population of the PMT’s JEM-
EUSO telescope focal surface will use has a failure rate
(per year) of 5.4 failures or roughly 27 PMTs are going
to fail during the mission due to the quantum efficiency
degradation and it is expected to operate during 43800
hours, it is necessary to estimate the especific number
of failures during mission time. The values from the
estimation were calculated using equation 14, and the
results are shown in Figure 6
8
Figure 6: Approximate number of PMT’s Failing
8. Conclusions
Results from this reliability study are as expected.
The levels of damage suffered by the PMTs which com-
prise the focal surface of JEM-EUSO Space Telescope,
are acceptable. The results show as well that the great-
est contribution to the failure is due to radiation SET,
as predicted by [21]. The guaranteed performance of
this equipment is a 99.45%, an accepted value of re-
liability thus fulfilling the objectives and technological
challenges of JEM-EUSO. It should be noted that the
reliability values of the Standard 217Plus, despite be-
ing a standard improved, an updated version of MIL-
HDBK-217 Plus does not have sections that include the
analysis of radiation of space electronic equipment. The
recommendation from this study is the inclusion of all
real failure effects may face an electronic, mechanical,
optical space equipment.
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